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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. ] 
STEVEN REESE CARTER, ] 
Defendant and Appellee. ] 
\ Case No. 960704-CA 
) Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK. 
In order to effectively address the defendant's arguments, 
it is helpful to lay out the framework under which his arguments 
should be analyzed.1 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits all unreasonable searches and 
seizures. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985). 
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless 
undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
^he analytical framework was briefly set out in the Brief of the Appellant. It is set out 
again in more detail and with more support in this reply brief because the defendant does not 
present some of his arguments in relation to this framework, thereby implicitly rejecting part of it. 
1 
In the instant case, Officer Whipple's seizure of the 
defendant was a level two investigative stop. See State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); R. 143-
46. Such stops have been recognized as a limited exception to 
the warrant requirement. State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 
App. 1988) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
"The touchstone of . . . [the] analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment is always *the reasonableness in all the circumstances 
of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal 
security.'" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108 (1977) 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19). To constitute a reasonable 
seizure and overcome the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against 
unreasonable seizures, a level two investigative stop must meet 
the following two-prong Terry test: (A) the initial stop must be 
justified by reasonable suspicion; and (B) the police officer's 
actions after the stop must be reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances justifying the stop* State v\ Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 
1276 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20 (1968)). 
2 
B. RESPONSE TO POINT I OF THE DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT: OFFICER 
WHIPPLE'S LEVEL TWO SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIED 
BY REASONABLE SUSPICION.2 
Point I of the defendant's argument (the initial seizure of 
the defendant was not supported by reasonable suspicion) deals 
with the first prong of the Terry test: the initial stop must be 
justified by reasonable suspicion. 
1. The Reasonable Suspicion Standard. 
Reasonable suspicion must be based on "objective facts 
suggesting that the individual may be involved in criminal 
activity.7' State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). Reasonable suspicion is 
the "^minimal level of objective justification'" required to 
seize a person; it is "considerably less than proof of wrongdoing 
by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Sokolow, 
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 
(1984)). In determining whether there was reasonable suspicion, 
the court must view the totality of facts and circumstances. 
2The defendant's contention that this issue should be considered even though he did not 
take a cross-appeal is correct in light of the fact that the defendant has raised this issue in his brief. 
See State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996). 
3 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7-8 (citations omitted); State v. Contrel, 
886 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted). 
As the discussion below illustrates, an examination of the 
facts and circumstances in the instant case shows that Officer 
Whipple's initial seizure of the defendant was justified by 
reasonable suspicion. 
2. The Basis for the Reasonable Suspicion in the Instant 
Case. 
In the instant case, Officer Whipple's level two seizure of 
the defendant was based on an attempt to locate ("ATL"). R. 144-
145. 
In his brief, the defendant argues that the legality of 
Officer Whipple's actions "are determined on the basis of the 
information which was available to him at the time he detained 
defendant," and Officer Whipple "was acting upon an impermissible 
assumption when he seized defendant and his vehicle" because he 
had not received sufficient information regarding the 
observations of Ricky Hafen (the person who initiated the attempt 
to locate upon which the initial seizure was based). Brief of 
Appellee at 4, 6. 
4 
These arguments fail in light of the following principles 
which were clarified by the court of appeals in State v. Case, 
884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994). 
If an officer seizes a person based solely on an ATL, the 
legality of the seizure "depend[s] on the sufficiency of the 
articulable facts known to the individual originating the 
information or bulletin subsequently received and acted upon by 
the investigating officer." Case, 884 P.2d at 1277 (citing 
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985); State v. 
Seel, 827 P.2d 954, 960 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1992)). The investigating officer need not be informed of 
the facts known to the originating source. Id. at 1277 n.5 ("The 
Supreme Court in Hensley specifically rejected the suggestion 
that the investigating officer must actually be informed of the 
facts known to the originating source.") (citing Hensley, 4 69 
U.S. at 231) . "An officer who receives a flyer or radio dispatch 
may take it at face value and act on it forthwith." Id. at 1277 
n.5. Then, "if the investigation culminates in arrest and the 
legality of the stop is challenged, the State becomes obligated, 
albeit after the fact, to show that legally sufficient 
5 
articulable suspicion prompted issuance of the fire or dispatch 
in the first place•" Id. 
Therefore, in determining whether Officer Whipple's seizure 
of the defendant was justified by reasonable suspicion, the facts 
known to the individual originating the ATL (Ricky Hafen) must be 
examined.3 Id. at 1277; R. 143-144. 
At the June 12, 1996, suppression hearing, the following 
testimony related to the basis for Hafenfs suspicion that the 
defendant had an open alcohol container in his vehicle was 
introduced: (1) On Friday, September 30, 1994, Hafen was working 
as an employee of the Arbyf s Restaurant located at the corner of 
700 South Bluff Street in St. George, Utah; (2) while working at 
the drive-through window that evening, Hafen observed the 
defendant in the driver's seat of a motor vehicle; (3) the 
occupants of the vehicle purchased food from the Arbyfs 
Restaurant and then proceeded on to the public street; (4) while 
the vehicle was still outside the drive-through window, Hafen 
3Even if reasonable suspicion was determined on the information Officer Whipple had at 
the time of the initial seizure, there was still reasonable suspicion. Officer Whipple recalled that 
dispatch broadcast the following information: (1) there was a possible open container subject at 
the Arby's restaurant; (2) an Arby's employee had seen an open container in a vehicle; (3) the 
vehicle left the drive-through window; (4) the vehicle was a small white compact pickup with a 
shell on it; and (v) there were two occupants in the vehicle. R. 144. 
6 
observed an open can of Keystone beer in the defendant's lap; (5) 
Hafen saw the defendant take a drink from that can as he left the 
drive-through window and proceeded toward the public street; (6) 
at that time, the can of beer appeared to be half-full; and (7) 
Mr. Hafen watched the vehicle until it pulled into the public 
street, and he did not see the defendant throw the Keystone beer 
can out of the vehicle. R. 143-144. 
Under the applicable standard explained above, Ricky Hafen 
had reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed the 
crime of open alcohol container in a vehicle.4 This suspicion 
was based on "objective facts" suggesting that the defendant may 
have been involved in criminal activity. See Menke, 787 P.2d at 
4In fact, in his brief, the defendant states: 
Hafen's observations concerning the apparent volume of liquid in the container and 
the fact that the suspect vehicle was in motion and traveling in the direction of the 
public street when the driver was observed drinking from the container may have 
given rise to reasonable suspicion had Officer Whipple received this information 
prior to detaining defendant. 
Brief of Appellee at 6. 
7 
541/ Contrel, 886 P,2d at 110, 739 P.2d at 88. Therefore, the 
first prong of the Terry test has been met.5 
B. RESPONSE TO POINTS II AND III OF THE DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT: 
OFFICER WHIPPLE'S LEVEL TWO SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT 
ILLEGAL IN TERMS OF ITS DURATION OR INTENSITY (OFFICER 
WHIPPLE'S ACTIONS AFTER THE STOP WERE REASONABLY RELATED IN 
SCOPE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE STOP) . 
Points II and III of the defendant's argument (the encounter 
was illegal in terms of its duration and intensity) deal with the 
second prong of the Terry test: the police officer's actions 
after the stop must be reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances justifying the stop. 
1. The Analytical Framework for Determining Whether the 
Police Officer's Actions After the Stop Were Reasonably 
Related in Scope to the Circumstances Justifying the 
Stop. 
There are no bright line rules or set criteria for 
determining whether the police officer's actions after the stop 
were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying 
the stop. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685 ("Much as a ^bright line' 
rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative 
5The reliability and veracity of Hafen's information should be assumed because he was a 
citizen who received no consideration from the St. George Police Department for providing this 
information. R. 144; State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992) ("Reliability and 
veracity are generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives nothing from the 
police in exchange for the information."). 
8 
detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human 
experience must govern over rigid criteria."). Bright line rules 
and set criteria are not very helpful in this analysis because 
each case presents a different factual scenario; therefore, 
different methods of investigation will be reasonable in 
different cases. See Id. at 686-87 ("*If the purpose underlying 
a Terry stop - investigating possible criminal activity - is to 
be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to 
detain the individual for longer than the brief time period 
involved in Terry and Adams . . .'") (quoting Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 and n.12 (1981)); Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (In discussing seizures based on 
"suspicion short of probable cause," the Court stated: "The scope 
of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the 
particular facts and circumstances of each case."); Terry, 392 
U.S. at 21-22 (The Court implicitly recognized that the level of 
permissible intrusion will vary with the facts when it stated: 
"And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer 
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion.) (emphasis added). 
9 
Therefore, when determining whether the police officer's 
actions after the stop were reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances justifying the stop, instead of relying on set 
rules and criteria, Utah courts and the United States Supreme 
Court have: (a) balanced the need for the detention against the 
invasion which the detention entails;6 and (b) determined whether 
the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was 
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. See Brief 
of Appellant at 12-13/ Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686 (In rejecting the 
establishment of a per se rule on the length of detention, the 
Court stated that in assessing whether a level two detention is 
too long in duration, "we consider it appropriate to examine 
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation 
that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, 
during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant."); 
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109 (In determining the reasonableness of the 
type of detention, the Court balanced the need for the detention 
6In his brief, the defendant makes several statements regarding the plaintiffs reliance on 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). The plaintiff simply cited Mimms to support its 
conclusion that in the present case, under this balancing test, the need for the detention 
(determining whether the defendant had an open container in his vehicle) outweighed the invasion 
with the detention entailed (having the defendant exit his vehicle). See Brief of Appellant at 13-
16. 
10 
(officer safety) against the invasion which the detention 
entailed (having the driver exit the vehicle) - the Court stated: 
" R e a s o i i a b J e i: 1 e s s, ::> f c o u i s e, ci e p e :! "Il b a ] a i i c e b e 1: w e e n 1: h e 
public interest and the individual's *c personal security free 
from, a r bi 1.1 a t , ' i nt ei I et encv 11\ I • • : • : s ' "") (quoting Ui :i ited 
States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. "r -, 78 (1975)); Terry, 392 
i Ji. S 11 „'" 0 ••,? 1 ( 111 d i F.cussiiKf I I it;1" .iiia.l y t i c a 1 f i" am^wo i k 
determining whether the officer's actions during the 
i nves ti gat i ve stop were i: easonable, the Court stated that " there 
is *no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by 
balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion 
which the search [or seizure] entails.'") (quoting Camera v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. o ^ , 534-35, 536-376 (1967)); State i 
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 1132-33 (Utah 1994); State v Ottesen, 920 
p^2d 183/ 1 8 5 (utah A p p # 1996); State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 
136 (Utah App. 1991) 
2. Officer Whipple's Request that the Defendant Exit His 
Vehicle Was Reasonably Related in Scope to the 
Circumstances Justifying the Stop. 
The plaintiff's initial arguments related to the second 
prong of the Terry test are set ^ut ^P +-K- Brief of the 
Appellant. See Brief of the Appellant at x^ x7. 
11 
In his brief, the defendant does not present his arguments 
related to the second prong of the Terry test in relation to the 
foregoing analytical framework; instead, he basically argues that 
an officer on a level two stop may only take certain specific 
actions that have been set out in several previous cases and one 
statute. See Brief of the Appellee at 6-15. 
The defendant's arguments are thus based on the false 
premise that the second prong of the Terry test is analyzed by 
using set rules and criteria regarding what an officer may do 
during a level two stop rather than determining on a case-by-case 
basis whether the detention was reasonable under analytical 
framework set out above. See discussion above. 
As the discussion below illustrates, the defendant's 
arguments fail. 
The defendant relies on State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 
1991) apparently for the proposition that during a level two 
seizure such as the one which took place in the instant case, 
police officers can only demand an explanation of the motorist's 
actions, "^request [a] driver's license and vehicle registration, 
conduct a computer check, and issue a citation,'" and "[a]fter he 
is cleared through this process, the motorist *must be allowed to 
12 
proceed without being subject to further delay 
for additional questioning." Brief of the Appellee ^ . 
(quoting State v, Johnson, 8 05 I .2d 7 6 3 , ; '» . - > - . 
The defendant's reliance on this language is misplaced. 
This lang uage 0:1: :t ] ] appl i es to i: ou t:i lie t t a t f ;i < • .stops where there 
is no reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, and the 
language i s perm i ss:i v e , not i estr I cti v e IIi I anquaqe 1:1 : .e 
defendant quotes from Johnson does not appear in that case; 
however, it does appeal : :i n several other cases, Iv : "-- :.a-e 
originally appeared in State v, Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 
1990) as follows: 
An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may 
request a driver's license and vehicle registration, 
conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. United 
States v, Guzman,864 F.2d 1512, 1513 (10th Cir. 1988). 
However, once the driver has produced a valid license 
and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, *he 
must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being 
subject to further delay by police for additional 
questioning.' Id. Any further temporary detention for 
investigative questioning after the fulfillment of the 
purpose of the traffic stop is justified under the 
Fourth Amendment only if the detaining officer has a 
reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity. Id. 
13 
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990) (emphasis 
added).7 When viewed in context in its entirety, it is apparent 
that the language relied on by the defendant applies to routine 
traffic cases where there is no reasonable suspicion of other 
criminal activity.8 The seizure in the instant case was not a 
routine traffic stop, and there was reasonable suspicion of an 
open container violation; therefore, this language does not apply 
to restrict Officer Whipple's actions in the instant case as the 
defendant seems to argue that it does. Furthermore, even if this 
language did apply to the instant case, it is permissive, not 
restrictive (it says what an officer may do - it does not 
restrict the officer to those specified actions in every case). 
7In other cases in which this language or substantially similar language appears, it is also 
prefaced by the statement: "an officer conducting a routine traffic stop." See e.g., State v. 
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452 (Utah 1995); State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1204 (Utah 1995); 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994); State v. Patefield, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 10 
(Utah App. 1996); State v. Matison, 875 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Sepulveda, 
842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 1992). 
8In Chapman, after this language was set out, the court stated: "While the present case is 
not a routine traffic stop, these same principles apply." Chapman, 921 P.2d at 952. The plaintiff 
contends that this statement does not refer to the list of steps an officer may take on routine traffic 
stop; instead, it refers to the following general principle that was set out in the same paragraph: 
"Once a stop is made, the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop." Id. 
14 
The defendant's reliance on State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P 2d 
652 (Utah App. 1992) is misplaced because Godina-Luna is 
factually distinguishable from the instant case. In Godina-Luna, 
the deputy stopped the car iii which the defendant was riding 
because he thought the driver might be intoxicated. Id. at 653. 
However, after stopping the car the officer immediately concluded 
that the occupants of the vehicle were sober Id, At that 
point, the purpose of the initial stop (to determine whether the 
driver was intoxicated) was satisfied, and the deputy had no 
reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, Jd. at 655. 
Nevertheless, the deputy continued to detain the occupants and 
asked them whether they had any alcohol, firearms or drugs in the 
vehicle. I d. A 1: 654 . The court held that the fur ther cie ten tion 
and questioning was illegal because prior ; the further 
d 'Ll L e 11L i i J i) 11111 i i.-j n e t ) 1 i u n i tii j ,  i In f n j i f M I ,S e \ i 11 i t J
 (i 1 11" i > | > 11«-id 
been satisfied and there was no reasonable suspicion of other 
c:i: imina ] act i v i t\ 5- a- s I d a t 6 5 4 5 5 , • • :' ; -
The instant case is factually distinguishable from Godina-
"TIH de 1 ei idLiJj) was .«J i ,,ed Ix-j^ au, \ llieii1 wa rcasniiidlj 11 
suspicion that he had an, open container in hi s vehicle. See R, 
I - ) 4-4 b; d i s c u s s i o i i at : ve The pii ipoM r hi-1 111 J t: j a l se i z\\ re 
15 
was to confirm or dispel that suspicion. See Menke, 787 P.2d at 
543 ("The very purpose of level two investigations is to verify 
or dispel the officers' suspicions."). However, Officer Whipple 
could not immediately confirm or dispel his suspicion because the 
odor of the Arby's food was masking the odor of the alcohol. R. 
145-46. Therefore, Officer Whipple had the defendant exit the 
vehicle to separate him from the odor of the Arby's food. Jd. 
Prior to having the defendant exit the vehicle, the purpose of 
the initial stop had not been satisfied, and there was reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant had an open container in his 
vehicle. Therefore, the basis for the holding in Godina-Luna 
does not exist in the instant case, and the defendant's reliance 
on that case does not support his argument. 
Finally, the defendant cites Terry and Section 77-7-15 of 
the Utah Code in support of his apparent argument that peace 
officers engaged in a level two stop may not "search for evidence 
on any level other than that which is implied by the authority to 
stop a suspect and demand his name, address, and an explanation 
of the actions which give rise to the officer's suspicion." 
Brief of the Appellee at 13-14. 
16 
Neither the courts n~^ ^ h~ "'egislature has set such rigid 
rules or parameters on what - officer may do on a level 
stop, See discussion above- .ie 1 anguage i n Section ' of 
the Utah Code is permissive, not restrictive Every police 
off: • icting a Il e we J !:  « «: s top • :i s i lot limited !:  D demand i ng 
the suspects name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
See e g i Lopez, 8 7 3 I 2d at 1132-33 (ai i offi cer conducting a 
routine traffic stop may request a driver's license inj vehicle 
and in in 
a warrants check if that check does not unreasonably extend the 
detention); Bountiful "y v. Maestas, 788 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah 
App. 1990) (when officer smelled alcohol on the defendant's 
breath, reasonable suspicion arose, and at: 1:1 lat point, the 
officer was justified 1n detaining the defendant for a reasonable 
period of time : administer field sobriety tests). 
Agai \ 111qu;L L \ i;1. wlipt hei: 1 he M . i:uie w a s i eason'iab 11 
under the circumstances. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108; Terry, 392 U.S. 
all 19, In cit't.ei in i n i ii<| whet lu"i f hr uoizur e w<a.s reasonable, .it •
 : 
must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis under the framework set 
t HI it ril \iv ,'iee d i s c u s s ! on ai J ;;>\/e Surh an •m11<11 Y M JI. S I 11 ust.rat: es 
17 
that the seizure in the instant case was reasonable. Id.; Brief 
of the Appellant at 12-17 
II. CONCLUSION 
See Brief of Appellant at 17. 
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